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Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions 
and Interconnectors1 
 
Abstract 
In the energy trilemma of reliability, sustainability and affordability, politicians treat reliability 
as over-riding. The EU assumes the energy-only Target Electricity Model will deliver reliability 
but the UK argues that a capacity remuneration mechanism is needed. This paper argues that 
capacity auctions tend to over-procure capacity, exacerbating the missing money problem they 
were designed to address. The bias is further exacerbated by failing to address some of the 
missing market problems also neglected in the debate. It examines the case for, criticisms of, and 
outcome of the first GB capacity auction and problems of trading between different capacity 
markets. 
 
1. Introduction 
Britain was the first country to introduce a capacity auction to deliver capacity adequacy 
after EU Third Package2 (to deliver the Target Electricity Model, TEM) was announced 
and it coincided with the date by which the TEM was to come into effect. The TEM is 
designed as an energy-only market that leaves the delivery of capacity adequacy to profit-
motivated investment decisions by liberalized and unbundled generation companies. The 
UK’s Energy Act 2013 that set out the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) rejected relying 
on an energy-only market and legislated for auctions to deliver capacity adequacy.  
This paper examines the design and justification of that capacity auction, its 
relation to the wider issue of reliability, and criticizes the under-studied issue of how the 
amount of capacity to procure was determined. It argues that typical capacity auction 
designs have a bias towards excess procurement, in contrast to fears that the energy-only 
market would lead to under-procurement. While capacity remuneration mechanisms, of 
which auctions are potentially the best, are intended to address the missing money 
problem, by ignoring the missing market problem they perversely exacerbate the missing 
money problem. Capacity auction design also raises important questions for cross-border 
trading and the role of interconnectors, which this paper addresses. 
 
2. Reliability, security of supply and capacity adequacy 
Energy policy aims to deliver security, sustainability and affordability, but of these three 
objectives politicians treat security,3 or more broadly, reliability, as over-riding. In 
electricity markets, reliability is the more inclusive term, measured by long-term 
                                                 
1 Paper arising from the Symposium on Energy Markets and Sustainability, Barcelona, 3 Feb. 
2015 
2 See e.g. http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Europe/Third-energy-package/  
3 Bompard et al (2013) provides a useful taxonomy of terms used to describe security. 
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satisfactory operation “so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of 
such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cybersecurity 
incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements.” (NERC, 2015). It requires both 
security and adequacy. Security is “(T)he ability to withstand sudden disturbances, such 
as electric short circuits or unanticipated losses of system components … ” (ENTSO-E, 
2015). Adequacy  is the ability “to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy 
requirements of the end-use customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and 
reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements.” (NERC, 2015). Security 
is a public good supplied by the System Operator (SO) through his acquisition of a range 
of ancillary and balancing services, while adequacy could, in principle, be delivered by 
competitive energy-only markets, as the TEM envisages (Oren, 2000).  
The TEM was designed as the next step in delivering the EU Integrated 
Electricity Market (IEM) due to come into effect by December 2014. Its core is an 
energy-only market with a single auction platform, EUPHEMIA (Pan-European Hybrid 
Electricity Market Integration Algorithm), for day-ahead, intra-day and balancing trades, 
which simultaneously clears bids and offers and the use of all interconnectors across the 
EU, fragmenting the market into different price zones only after interconnectors are fully 
used. Its working hypothesis, that energy-only markets will deliver capacity adequacy, 
was based on the experience of Nord Pool, which served as the model for the TEM.  
Nord Pool has operated a successful energy-only trading system for many years, 
as have the major power exchanges such as EEX and APX, without any apparent 
problems of capacity adequacy, but not all EU countries have (or once) followed this 
model. Many markets have made or continue to make capacity payments, and DG COMP 
has been very critical of this practice, arguing that they often have more to do with 
compensating generators for stranded assets than delivering reliability at least cost. The 
GB capacity market is,4 as of early 2015, the only capacity market to be explicitly 
designed and operating since the announcement of the Third Energy Package.  
As a number of countries are now considering whether, and if so how, to 
introduce a (or reform their) Capacity Revenue Mechanisms it is timely to examine the 
British experience. Eurelectric is the latest organization to recognize that not all EU 
countries will be happy with the reference energy-only markets of the TEM, and 
“recognizes that properly designed capacity markets, developed in line with the objective 
of the IEM, are an integral part of a future market design.” (Eurelectric, 2015, p4.)  While 
that document discusses what might be required to deliver a reliability standard, it is 
somewhat sceptical on how this might be achieved, instead arguing that “whatever 
reliability standard is chosen, Regulators and TSOs should compute it with 
methodologies and tools that are publicly available.” A second objective of this paper is 
                                                 
4 Northern Ireland is part of the SEM discussed below, leaving Great Britain, GB, as the rest of the UK. 
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to assess how this might best be done, guided by the principle of addressing the missing 
market problem. 
 
3. Missing money and missing markets 
Given the need to instantly balance supply and demand in the electricity system, ensuring 
short-term security of supply is normally an obligation placed on the SO, while longer 
term capacity adequacy is often the subject of regulatory and political concern. EU 
electricity markets are now liberalized, and generation is, for the most part, not subject to 
traditional utility regulation, but to normal competition policy both domestically and 
under the scrutiny of DG COMP. If investment decisions could be solely guided by 
strictly commercial decisions and if markets were not subject to policy interventions or 
price caps, it is plausible that capacity adequacy could be delivered by profit-motivated 
generation investment without explicit policy guidance. For this to be the case, investors 
need confidence that the revenue they earn from the energy markets (including those 
supplying the ancillary services that the SO needs to ensure short-term stability) will be 
adequate to cover investment and operating costs.  
If this revenue is not adequate, there is a “missing money” problem (Joskow, 
2013), but if it is adequate but not perceived to be so by generation companies or their 
financiers, then there is a “missing market” problem (Newbery, 1989). Missing money 
problems arise if price caps are set too low (below the Value of Lost Load, VoLL), or 
ancillary services, such as flexibility, ramp-rates, frequency response, black start 
capability, etc. and/or balancing services are inadequately remunerated, or transmission 
access charges are inefficiently high (important in distorting exit decisions), and/or, 
energy prices are inefficiently low. Inefficiently low wholesale prices seem less likely as 
the normal problem is one of market power raising prices above their competitive level, 
and prices are not necessarily inefficiently low just because there is excess capacity.  
Missing markets create problems if risks cannot be efficiently allocated with 
minimal transaction costs through futures and contract markets, or if important 
externalities such as CO2 and other pollutants are not properly priced. The concept of 
missing markets can be usefully extended to cases in which politicians and/or regulators 
are not willing to offer hedges against future market interventions that could adversely 
affect generator profits. These arguments have been extensively covered in the literature, 
recently in the Symposium on ‘Capacity Markets’, (Joskow, 2013; Cramton, Ockenfels 
and Stoft, 2013). Almost all the discussion about capacity mechanisms concentrates on 
the missing money problem and whether the various market and regulatory/political 
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failures are sufficient to justify a capacity mechanism, and if so, what form it should best 
take.5   
Both the missing money and missing market failures have risen in salience as 
renewable electricity targets have become more ambitious at the same time as the EU 
Emissions Trading System has failed to deliver an adequate, durable and credible carbon 
price, and as such is under constant threat of reform. Absent a futures market with a 
credible counter-party it is hard to be confident that future electricity prices will be 
remunerative for unsubsidized generation, and harder to convince bankers or 
shareholders of the credibility of investment plans based on forecast revenues. If 
renewables continue their planned increase in market share mandated by the EU 
Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC) they will depress average energy prices. This does not 
of itself give rise to an adequacy problem, although utilities may justifiably complain that 
their past investment decisions have been partially expropriated by unanticipated political 
actions. However, it increases the demand for existing services such as primary reserves, 
fast frequency response and inertia and may also increase the need for additional 
ancillary services. If these services are not yet adequately defined and/or their future 
prices are hard to predict there is a missing market problem. If these services are 
underpriced by SOs whose powers of balancing supply and demand may be met by 
administrative or regulatory means (e.g. by requiring those connecting to the grid to make 
some of these services available as part of the grid code), there is a missing money 
problem. In either case these may precipitate a capacity adequacy problem. 
Newbery (2013) documents the analysis that led to the UK’s EMR and its 
embodiment in the Energy Act 2013, which was primarily designed to rescue the UK’s 
failing attempt to meet its renewable energy targets at least cost. Renewable electricity 
suffered from both the missing money and missing market problems, as support was 
provided by Premium Feed-in Tariffs via Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs). 
Their value depended on future electricity prices and the supply-demand balance for the 
ROC s, both potentially volatile. While fossil generation enjoyed a natural hedge in that 
electricity prices mirrored fossil fuel prices (see Newbery, 2013, fig 2), renewables and 
nuclear power, whose fuel costs are zero or very small, are exposed to the full volatility 
of electricity prices (Roques et al., 2006; 2008), which increases risk unnecessarily and 
hence raises the cost of capital, the major part of the total cost.  The EMR instead 
proposed long-term Contracts for Differences (CfDs) with fixed indexed strike prices to 
solve both the missing money and the missing futures market problems. 
 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Adib et al. (2008), Batlle et al. (2007), Battle and Rodilla (2010), Bowring (2008, 
2013), Chao and Wilson (1987, 2002), Crampton and Ockenfels (2011), Cramton and Stoft 
(2008), Joskow (2008), Joskow and Tirole (2007); O’Neill at al. (2006); Platchkov et al (2011); 
and de Vries (2007). 
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3.1 Market failures in delivering reliability 
Before the electricity industry was liberalized and unbundled, the SO had ownership 
control of generation and transmission and was responsible for both system security and 
adequacy. Planned investment ensured that both capabilities would be assessed, which 
was also much easier when essentially all plant had (at least in aggregate) a predictable 
and controllable output. The main security aspects were handling very short-run increases 
in demand (notably during intermissions in major sporting events when consumers all 
simultaneously switch on their electric kettles) or those caused by the loss of a large 
station or transmission link. The standard approach was to specify a reserve margin and 
ensure adequate short-run flexibility by the choice of plant type. Thus the Central 
Electricity Generating Board, CEGB, that pre-dated the British restructuring of 1989, 
computed the required gross reserve margin at 19% based on a Loss of Load Probability 
(LoLP) calculation and a reliability measure (disconnecting some consumers in three 
winters over a 100 years, decided in 1962 (Bates and Fraser, 1974, p122). It built pumped 
storage systems to provide fast response, peaking capacity and to use surplus night-time 
nuclear power (Williams, 1991), as well as jet-derivative gas turbines for fast ramping. 
With liberalization and unbundling all these security services had to be separately 
procured by the SO. Some had to be remunerated, others, such as inertia and the 
additional security offered by interconnectors, came at no cost to the SO. The SO now 
had to manage transmission constraints using price signals (distorted through a failure to 
adopt efficient locational marginal pricing) dealing bilaterally with generators out to 
maximize profits and typically possessing short-run market power. In addition the SO 
had to secure various ancillary and balancing services through spot and contract markets, 
just when the challenges of handling increasing volumes of intermittent and less 
predictable wind were increasing (Newbery, 2010, introducing “Large-scale wind power 
in electricity markets” in that issue of Energy Policy; Newbery, 2012). 
Although the delivery of security services is a public good provided by the SO, 
these services can be procured through some combination of forward, prompt and real-
time markets and contracts. As problems of intermittency increase, so does the challenge 
of ensuring that these services are efficiently priced and procured (Pöyry, 2014).  
The Single Electricity market (SEM) of the island of Ireland is probably at the 
forefront of addressing these problems, as it is a small moderately isolated system in 
which individual power stations are large and lumpy relative to peak demand (up to 10%) 
and the system is being adapted to handle up to 70% non-synchronous wind penetration.6 
One (implausible) solution would have price signals varying over very short periods of 
                                                 
6 Conventional rotating generation turbines are synchronised to the grid frequency and have 
substantial inertia, so that if there is a momentary loss of supply, that inertia prevents the 
frequency falling too fast. Wind power has effectively no inertia, which has to be provided in 
some form to maintain frequency within acceptable limits. 
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time. A sudden fall in frequency caused by a sudden increase in demand relative to 
supply means that the value of power in the next cycle (1/50th of a second) has increased, 
and the speed of response is key to minimizing the disruption. Figure 1 lists the various 
products and their time domain that the SEM Committee defined in their consultation 
document (SEM, 2014), grouped into the three categories of Synchronous Inertial 
Response (SIR, usually delivered by the inertia of synchronized generators), operating 
reserves (primary, POR; secondary, SOR; and tertiary, TOR), and Ramping or 
Replacement Reserves (RR), with some overlap between them.  
If prices were to move in response to instantaneous system conditions, then it 
would be potentially profitable to have the capability to respond on the appropriate time 
scale. In practice, market designs vary in their granularity, with the most flexible having 
5 minute settlement periods (Australia). Typically Continental balancing markets have a 
15 minute settlement period,7 while GB and the SEM have a half-hourly settlement 
period in the Day Ahead Market (DAM), and most Continental power exchanges and the 
EUPHEMIA auction platform have hourly resolution in the DAM. Increasing granularity 
improves the accuracy of the temporal pattern of price signals to guide the choice of 
flexibility, but runs up against the practical constraint that the system state requires a 
finite amount of time to re-estimate, probably of the order of minutes, while the 
transaction costs of dealing at high frequency make very short-term markets illiquid. 
 
Figure 1 Various flexible systems services defined for the SEM 
Source: SEM (2014)  
 
Given the inability and absence of energy markets at this level of time granularity, 
new products are needed to supplement existing products. The SEM Committee 
consulted on how to procure them in early 2015, given that the supply side for some 
                                                 
7 Also suggested by Mott MacDonald (2013). California is interested in 5 minute granularity. 
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services is highly concentrated, raising market power issues. In this case many markets 
are missing as their procurement is still undecided, making it hard to estimate their future 
revenues. When choosing what type of generating plant to build, investors have a choice 
of characteristics with inevitable trade-offs: flexible plant with high ramp rates is either 
more expensive or less efficient than less flexible plant with lower ramp rates, but unless 
investors can forecast the revenue from selling these security services, it is hard to make 
efficient plant choices.  
The classic public good problem facing the regulators and the SO is how to value 
these various services, given that they are provided in bundles of varying proportions by 
different technologies. Some of the services reduce LoLP, and should be informed by the 
VoLL, but others reduce the need to curtail renewable generation, which is a political 
objective of uncertain value. 
 
3.2 Defining and measuring reliability 
Eurelectric (2015) provides a useful summary of the various ways used to measure 
reliability. Most EU electricity systems specify the “Loss of Load Expectation” (LoLE), 
which for most and for GB is three hours per year. This is a forward looking measure, 
that taking a representative and large number of possible outcomes (of weather, plant 
reliability, demand, etc.) for some future period, the electricity system should perform 
better than averaging “Losses of Load events” of three hours per year. Clearly there is a 
difference between losing load for the entire population and controlled disconnections for 
a modest number of consumers, and Eurelectric (2015) argues that a better measure is the 
Loss of Expected Energy (LoEE) measured in MWh/year. National Grid (2014a) uses the 
cost of LoEE to determine the procurement amount for the capacity auction.  
The former CEGB had a standard of disconnections in three winters in 100 years 
or 3%, while Belgium had a 1% standard and Spain a 5% standard (Webb, 1977). This 
was often translated into a gross reserve margin (Transmission Entry Capacity less peak 
load) required to deliver the reliability standard. Thus the CEGB set it at 19% , made up 
of a de-rating factor of 11% and remaining outage risks of 6%, so that the de-rated 
reliability margin was 7% (6%/0.89). Such quantitative measures sit well within the 
planning framework of a centrally controlled electricity system pre-liberalization. 
The other more market-oriented approach to reliability is to specify the Value of 
Lost Load, VoLL, the amount that consumers should be willing to pay to avoid 
disconnection. In a future with sufficiently smart meters, consumers would be able to 
sign a contract with the electricity supplier stating the maximum amount they would be 
willing to pay for each tranche of firm power, with the smart meter disconnecting 
appliances at each specified price point, leaving presumably some lights and electronic 
equipment until last. As such that would represent the complete private good market 
solution to the problem and would avoid the missing money if not the missing (future) 
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market problem, provided the short-run prices were efficiently set at their efficient 
scarcity value. This is the sum of the System Marginal Cost (SMC) plus a Capacity 
Payment, CP, where 
CP = LoLP*(VoLL-SMC),     (1) 
The relationship between the security standard and the VoLL is symmetric, in that 
if capacity investment decisions are based on revenues determined by (1) and the VoLL 
is pre-determined, then the resulting capacity will give rise to a LoLE. If the standard is 
as a predetermined LoLE, the cost of new capacity implies a cost of delivering the LoLP 
and hence the VoLL.  
Britain has followed both models. The English Pool set the VoLL at £(2012)5,000 
(€6,250/MWh at £1 = €1.25), letting the market determine capacity. After the Pool was 
replaced with an energy-only market in 2001, the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) specified the LoLE.  National Grid (2014a) deduced the 2018 VoLL as 
£(2012)17,000/MWh (€(2012)21,250/MWh), higher than direct estimates of the 
willingness to pay to avoid disconnections (London Economics, 2013). 
 
3.3 Can energy-only markets deliver adequate reliability? 
One completely legitimate case for a capacity payment is that if generators are required to 
bid their Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC, mostly fuel costs), as under the Bidding Code 
of Practice of the SEM (SEM, 2007), they will fail to recover their fixed costs without 
such an addition. The Electricity Pool of England and Wales also added the CP of (1), but 
allowed generators to offer an unrestricted supply function (which, given their market 
power, was often above SRMC, Green and Newbery, 1992; Newbery, 1995; Sweeting, 
2007). In this period of benign liberalization, high prices led to considerable entry and an 
excessive reserve margin. 
In the energy-only market envisaged by the TEM, generators will offer supply 
functions that should reflect the scarcity value of electricity (and their degree of market 
power). Figure 2 shows the day-ahead price duration curves for several European power 
exchanges in 2012. What is striking is that most exchange prices do not exceed 
€200/MWh, and even the most peaky, France, only does so 0.25 of 1% of the time (about 
22 hours per year). Given that the VoLL in the English Pool until 2001 was 
€(2012)6,250/MWh and the current implied VoLL in GB is €(2012)21,250/MWh (both at 
£1 = €1.25), these prices indicate a low LoLP or high reliability. Given existing capacity 
levels that is a reasonable inference, but the problem again is one of missing (futures) 
markets. Investment lags in delivering capacity adequacy are 2-4 years for peaking plant 
(longer for most base-load plant), beyond the time horizon of adequately liquid futures 
markets (and they only offer one year’s hedge). 
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Figure 2 Price Duration curves of day-ahead hourly prices, 2012 
Sources: MIP (Market Index Price) and NL prices from APX, Germany and France from EEX 
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the 2008 balancing buy prices8 in the 
energy-only market that replaced the Pool were considerably peakier than the old Pool 
prices (which included an explicit CP and also probably reflected more market power). 
Thus energy-only markets can reflect scarcity, and properly calculated capacity payments 
may be very low if the reserve margin is adequate as LoLP is roughly exponential in 
demand less derated capacity (Newbery, 2005). However, by 2013-14, the GB Balancing 
Mechanism had a price duration curve quite similar to those shown in Figure 2, with 
prices above €200/MWh for less than 0.25 of 1% of the time, and well below the French 
day-ahead price duration curve. 
Thus one might conclude that energy-only markets (which include balancing 
markets) can deliver sufficiently sharp scarcity prices that should signal the profitability 
of adequate new investment, provided all the other security services are adequately 
remunerated (i.e. resolving any of those missing market problems). This might be 
plausible if all investment decisions were taken on commercial grounds as in the 1990s, 
that prices were not capped, that the policy environment were predictable and stable, and 
that either liquid forward market existed for a reasonably fraction of the proposed plant 
life (i.e. 20+ years ahead of the final investment decision) or credible long-term power 
purchase agreements could be signed with credit-worthy counterparties. Unfortunately, 
hardly any of these conditions hold in the TEM.  
                                                 
8 For a description of the British Balancing Mechanism see Newbery (2005).  
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Figure 3 Scarcity pricing in GB under the Pool and in the Balancing Mechanism 
Sources:   National Grid, Elexon 
Notes: PPP is Pool Purchase Price, SMP is the System Marginal Price, so PPP-SMP=CP 
3.4 Market, institutional and political/regulatory failures 
While price caps are set at rather low levels in the US, exacerbating the “missing money” 
problem, there are also, if much higher, price caps in EUPHEMIA (for day-ahead at 
€3,000/MWh, a price that France has hit on numerous occasions). The lack of forward 
markets and long-term contracts might not be so critical if the future were reasonably 
predictable and stable, but this is far from the case at present. EU Climate Change policy 
is failing, in conflict with Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC), and surely ripe for as yet 
uncertain reform. Large volumes of unreliable renewables increase the need for flexible 
reserves, which in the past came from obsolescing plant, mostly oil or coal. This plant is 
now being decommissioned because of the Large Combustion Plant Directive and the 
Integrated Emissions Directive.  
Increasing renewables (mainly wind and solar PV) add little to reliable capacity, 
as it is unavailable on still cold dark winter nights, but reduces average wholesale prices. 
If the average capacity factor of on-shore wind is 25%, then the GB target of 30% of 
electricity from wind requires capacity of 30/25 times or 120% of average demand. In 
windy conditions that would often displace all conventional plant and could lead, under 
present subsidy structures, to negative prices. 
Intermittent generation increases the need for additional flexible plant that can be 
called up at short notice if the wind falls or the sun fades. In addition, new plant will be 
needed to replace retiring plant (not just coal, but in the UK, France and Germany, 
substantial volumes of nuclear plant as well). That plant will need considerably higher 
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prices when renewable output is low than has been recently experienced. Even if the 
carbon price is currently low, the EU is committed to an 80% reduction in Greenhouse 
Gas emissions by 2050. Coal is twice the carbon intensity of gas, so utilities are unlikely 
to build durable (40-60 year) coal-fired plant that would face tight future emissions 
limits, leaving gas-fired plant as the only alternative. Unfortunately, crashed electricity 
prices and high gas prices precipitated by the closure of Japan’s nuclear fleet has made 
their economics very unattractive. 
The UK introduced a carbon price floor in the 2011 Budget (HMT, 2011) that 
would support the price of CO2 at £16/tonne in 2013, rising to £30/tonne (€35/tonne) in 
2020, and projected to rise to £70/tonne by 2030 (all at 2009 prices).  This threatened the 
operation of existing coal-fired plant. As an example of policy instability, the 2014 
Budget froze the carbon price floor – clearly an instrument subject to the whim of 
chancellors creates additional investment uncertainty. It would be a brave politician who 
trusted these markets to deliver reliability.  
 
4. The GB capacity auction 
In response to the looming capacity crunch and other market failures set out in Ofgem 
(2009) and subsequent DECC consultations (Newbery, 2012a), the UK passed the Energy 
Act 2013 setting out the EMR, which includes a Capacity Mechanism to ensure adequate 
capacity. GB now has the Secretary of State for Energy & Climate Change, advised by 
DECC, deciding how much capacity is required. The capacity auction is a single-price 
descending clock auction with a demand schedule as shown in figure 4. National Grid as 
SO was charged to recommend the target volume of capacity to secure four years after 
the auction (which was termed the T-4 auction).   
National Grid (2014a) chose the amount to procure balancing the cost of 
additional capacity against the cost of the Loss of Expected Energy, as shown in Figure 5. 
National Grid (2014a) projected that the auction clearing price would likely be set at the 
Cost of New Entry (CONE), estimated at £49/kWyr. This was the missing money a 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) might need given its revenues from all other 
markets and after paying the Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges. 
These range from £30/kWyr (in NW Scotland), to negative (-£5/kWyr in Cornwall) 
(National Grid, 2013). Entrants are given 15-year indexed contracts, while existing plant 
receive one-year contracts to defer exit decisions until the next auction.  
The missing money can be estimated from the VoLL (£17/kWh) less the 
maximum the SO pays for balancing actions (£6/kWh) to give £11/kWh, times 3 hrs 
LoLE, or £33/kWyr. The effective cap in the Balancing Mechanism is £9,999/MWh 
would reduce the missing money to £21/kWyr.  
12 
 
 
Figure 4 Auction demand curve as proposed 
Source: DECC (2013)  
 
 
Figure 5 Capacity needed to minimize total cost in the Slow Progression scenario 
Source: National Grid (2014a, fig 12, p50) with additions by the author 
 
The auction design was best-practice (Newbery and Grubb, 2015) but flawed in 
requiring the SO to advise the minister on the procurement amount. The SO stands 
accountable if “the lights go out” but does not pay for the capacity. The minister wishes 
to avoid newspaper headlines predicting blackouts resulting from his decision. Both 
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argue for excess procurement. DECC appointed an independent Panel of Technical 
Experts (PTE) to comment on the analysis, and they made a number of strong (but, for 
the 2014 auction, ineffective) criticisms. 
 
4.1 Criticisms of the capacity to procure 
The PTE first criticized the terminology of “Loss of Load” as emotive and misleading. 
The GB regulator, Ofgem, defines a “Loss of Load event” as one in which market 
demand exceeds market supply and as such the SO has to intervene to balance the 
system. For that purpose the SO can call on a range of increasingly expensive options: 
asking generators to temporarily exceed rated capacity; invoking ‘new balancing 
services’;9 cutting interconnector exports to zero, requesting imports; reducing voltage 
(“brown outs”),10 before finally resorting to selective disconnections. The crucial point is 
that these actions cost less, often much less, than VoLL and hence bias the unserved load 
cost and the target capacity in figure 5 upward.  
Successful Capacity Market Units in the auction receive a Capacity Agreement 
which requires them to be available in “stress events” signaled four hours ahead. DECC 
(2014, §391) defines these events as “any settlement periods in which either voltage 
control or controlled load shedding are experienced at any point on the system for 15 
minutes or longer. …  Periods of voltage control or load shedding resulting from failures 
or deficiencies in the transmission or distribution systems are not considered as stress 
events.” However, these “notices of inadequate system margin” are issued “based on the 
available capacity (declared ‘maximum export limit’ (MEL) minus transmission system 
demand and reserve for response capacity.”  DECC (2014, box, p107.) 
National Grid (2014a) chose the amount to procure using a Least Worst Regrets 
approach as it was unwilling to attach explicit probabilities to the various scenarios 
considered. The result of overvaluing the cost of “Loss of Load” is to increase the 
capacity at which the Least Worst Regret cost schedule is minimized (figure 5). “Slow 
progression” reaches a cost minimum at 53.3 GW for 2018-19 delivery. The net 
procurement target is 53.3-w-x-y-z-0.4 GW, where w, x, y and z refer to various 
distributed energy resources and opt-out plant. The 0.4 GW is existing short-term 
operating reserve.  
The PTE (DECC, 2014a) strongly criticized National Grid for assuming no net 
imports in stress periods, despite 3.75 GW interconnection capacity and potential new 
capacity of 2.25 GW that might be available by 2018-19. This seemed perverse, as all 
                                                 
9   “The new balancing services are Demand Side Balancing Reserve (DSBR) and Supplemental 
Balancing Reserve (SBR).” National Grid announced its tender for these new services on 10 June 
2014 (http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/additionalmeasures ). 
10 The CEGB estimated that voltage reductions reduce load by 7½% in the 1970s (Bates and 
Fraser, 1974) but National Grid now estimates only 1½% in the absence of firm evidence. 
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parties (Ofgem, DECC and National Grid) agreed interconnectors increased security. 
Three reports commissioned by these parties (Pöyry, 2012, 2013; Redpoint, 2013) argued 
that interconnector capacity could displace domestic capacity by 50-80% of its value. 
Even DECC’s Final Impact Assessment, published just before the procurement decision 
(DECC, 2014b), estimated the amount of interconnector capacity to include in the total 
procurement amount at 2.9 GW. Ignoring interconnectors could move the auction 
clearing price from the cost of new entry of £49/kWyr to that set by existing plant 
(maximum of £25/kWyr), increasing the auction cost by £1.3 billion per year. 
Ignoring interconnectors seemed particularly perverse as the TEM aims to 
integrate markets across borders. Market coupling already dispatches GB Continental 
interconnectors in the EUPHEMIA day-ahead market (DAM). Interconnector flows 
already reflect willingness to pay in the DAM, and will soon do so in the intra-day and 
real time markets when network codes are agreed. 
 
4.2 Possible consequences of excessive capacity procurement 
Excess procured capacity will lower future wholesale prices with a number of effects, not 
all immediately obvious. First, lower prices reduce the revenue new entrants can expect 
from the energy markets, increase the CONE and raise the auction price. Second, it 
undermines the old market design in which investment in conventional generation was at 
the discretion of private companies making commercial decisions. No company would 
invest in conventional generation without a capacity agreement given its large 
disadvantage compared to those with agreements. The amount of new plant will therefore 
be entirely determined by the minister, ending a key element of the liberalized market. 
All non-fossil generation will also be granted long-term Contracts for Difference  (CfDs) 
under the EMR, moving GB to the Single Buyer model ruled out in earlier EU Electricity 
Directives. 
Third, lower prices increase payments to low-carbon CfDs, which receive the 
difference between the contracted strike and wholesale price. As the Government limits 
total renewables payments through the Levy Control Framework, the perverse effect is to 
support less renewable electricity, although the EMR was designed to remove obstacles 
to meeting the renewables target. 
Fourth, the commercial case for interconnectors depends on price differences, 
with GB typically importing from cheaper Continental markets. Lower GB prices reduce 
arbitrage profits, undermining the investment case for the additional interconnectors 
when they are increasingly needed to balance growing intermittent generation across 
wider market areas. Ignoring interconnectors risks a self-fulfilling but expensive policy of 
autarky. 
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Fifth, although the future wholesale price will be lower, offsetting possibly a large 
part of the consumer cost, it will be hard to convince consumers of this. They will see the 
gross cost estimated at 53.3 GW x £49m/GWyr = £2.6 billion per year.  
Finally, on 2nd December 2014, after the PTE had published its critical report and 
the Secretary of State had decided on the procurement volume, but before the auction on 
18th December, the Treasury’s National Infrastructure Plan announced that 
interconnectors would be eligible for the 2015 capacity market.11 It would have been easy 
to have left room for interconnectors (e.g. adding another element to the -w-x-y-z-0.4 GW 
deduction from the target volume) and lower the net amount to procure. 
 
4.3 The outcome of the 2014 capacity auction 
The auction cleared at £(2012) 19.40/kWyr (National Grid, 2014b). The auction produced 
several surprises. First, the auction cleared at less than 40% of the predicted CONE value 
of £49/kWyr (although close to the missing money estimated above assuming a balancing 
cap of £9,999/MWh). The estimated CONE was based on new entry of CCGT, and two 
CCGTs entered, supplying about 60% of the total 2,795 MW new entry. Second, the next 
largest (28%) entry category was OCGT/ reciprocating engines, average size 11 MW. 
The third largest contribution (6%) was from unproven Demand Side Response (DSR, all 
with a one-year contract, other new entrants have 15-year contracts).  
One might expect that DSR and OCGTs would require a lower strike price, 
particularly as they can contribute to significantly reducing TNUoS charges if they are 
embedded with major loads, but the low price that CCGTs were willing to accept is 
surprising, and may be based on optimistic views of gas prices (which were expected to 
decline by the time of the auction) or high balancing prices. National Grid announced its 
tender for new balancing services on 10 June 2014,12 reducing the extent of the missing 
money for these services after DECC had published its estimate of the net CONE.   
The final point is that the auction demonstrates the value of market-based 
methods of revealing entry costs, and the danger of leaving such decisions to SOs or 
regulators (as in the SEM,13 where the regulators calculate the cost of Best New Entry 
and set it at a high price).  
5. Biases in capacity auctions and energy-only markets 
The arguments above strongly suggest that if procurement decisions are left to politicians 
advised by the SO, they will err on the high side, and tend to ignore supplies from outside 
their control area (over interconnectors). Their caution is exacerbated by the emotive and 
                                                 
11 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-infrastructure-plan  
12 At http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/additionalmeasures  
13 See http://www.allislandproject.org/en/cp_current-consultations.aspx?article=75c548a7-34ee-
497c-afd2-62f8aa0062df  
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misleading terminology of “Loss of Load”. Some of these shortcomings can be addressed 
by requiring the SO to cost and quantify the actions that are taken in stress events that fall 
short of controlled disconnections. Delegating the decision to independent agencies, 
perhaps to an Independent Planning and System Operator could depoliticize the decision 
(but might not remove the fear of disconnections through inadequacy, nor the bias of not 
paying for capacity).  
There is a more fundamental problem in that if future energy prices are 
competitively delivered and if all security services (ancillary and balancing) are properly 
priced, the missing market and missing money problems can both be addressed by 
offering suitable hedging contracts, of which the auctioned capacity agreement is an 
excellent example. Price caps could be replaced by reliability options or one-way CfDs 
that have a high strike price, and which allow consumers or their suppliers to hedge 
against high prices while allowing the spot and balancing market prices to reach scarcity 
levels needed for efficient actions (in demand reduction and interconnector trade) (see 
e.g. Vásquez et al, 2002; Bidwell, 2005). 
Now consider the costs of under or over-specifying the amount to procure. Over-
procurement, as noted above, risks depressing future prices and hence reducing future 
energy and ancillary service revenues, requiring a higher auction price in compensation. 
While addressing the missing markets problem it risks amplifying the missing money 
problem. In contrast, under-procurement leads to expectations of higher future prices, 
requiring a lower capacity auction bid as the capacity agreement does not preclude 
earning revenues in all the energy markets. If the price is very low, investors may 
conclude that investing without a capacity agreement has relatively low risk, particularly 
as the design of the GB auction offers a T-4 contract of 15 years for new plant, but 
successive T-1 contracts of one-year for existing plant at the same clearing price, for 
which speculative plant would be eligible. A signal to err on the side of under-
procurement would be underwritten by the ability to true up closer to delivery, reducing 
risks, as any over-procurement would merely delay the moment at which more capacity 
was needed in the auction, and should limit the period of inadequate revenue to a year or 
so. 
 
6. The need for regional coordination 
Eureletric (2015) argues strongly for a design of regional capacity markets which places 
the obligation on generation (or demand) regardless of national location. This requires a 
common regional capacity adequacy assessment and no double payment (i.e. if capacity 
has an agreement from country A it would be denied one from B and would be excluded 
from B’s capacity assessment, subject to adequate interconnector capacity from B to A).  
While this may be a desirable long-run objective, it is hardly compatible with the 
existing Third Package. Meanwhile countries will have to decide how to treat 
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interconnectors connecting possibly very different (or no) capacity markets. Provided the 
auction platform can accommodate efficient scarcity prices (i.e. provided at least the 
intra-day and balancing markets are not capped at too low a level), then trading over any 
interconnector will only benefit a country that ensures that the relevant prices are 
efficient, as in (1). Suppose A and B trade but A has a higher VoLL than B, and hence a 
larger reliability margin. If A and B both have stress events, A can outbid B to secure 
imports, with B accepting a higher LoLP reflecting its lower willingness to pay to avoid 
disconnections, while ensuring that domestic consumers were insulated from these high 
trading prices through the contract coverage provided by the Reliability Options.  
The logic of making adequacy as close as possible to a private market good 
(through allowing efficient pricing) is that there can be gains from trade for the efficiently 
priced market even when market designs are different. If prices are inefficient in B, then 
it is they who lose, not A. That provides incentives to reform and avoids the need for 
politically fraught agreements on harmonization. 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
Missing money and missing markets provide compelling reasons for a capacity payment 
in competitive electricity markets dominated by politically determined and subsidized 
unreliable generation and where investors lack confidence in future revenues. Capacity 
auctions (GB provides a good example) address the missing money problem and part of 
the missing market problem (the missing futures markets), which still needs efficient 
solutions - markets, auctions and procurement contracts - for location, flexibility, etc. 
needed to deliver security. More complex category auctions may also be the best way of 
procuring these services. The part of the adequacy debate that has been neglected is how 
to, and who should, determine the amount and type of capacity to procure (generation, 
DSR, interconnection), a problem that is exacerbated by misunderstandings over what a 
“Loss of Load” event means and what it might cost.  
This paper argues that this neglect biases towards over-procurement, which leads 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy that merchant generation investment can no longer be relied 
upon. Perversely, this exacerbates the missing money problem that capacity auctions 
were designed to address. The bias is further exacerbated by failing to address some of 
the missing market problems that have also been neglected in the debate. 
Whether or not interconnectors should be included in auctions is less important 
than that their contribution should be recognized in determining the procurement amount. 
All British interconnectors are HVDC controllable links whose flows can be rapidly 
reversed and as such could provide extra imports at short notice, but they can also impose 
sudden large loads on the GB system if they switch to exporting. The UK Government, 
possibly under pressure from DG COMP over State Aid concerns after the PTE had 
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published their criticisms (DECC, 2014a), decided to include interconnectors in the next 
auction for 2019-20 delivery, and consult on how to determine their reliable capacity. 
There remain a number of policy issues to resolve, not least how the European 
auction platform EUPHEMIA will determine the direction of flows close to real time, 
when stress events that the capacity auction was designed to address are likely to emerge. 
EUPHEMIA has a €3,000/MWh price cap on the DAM, well below the VoLL. It has not 
yet (early 2015) fixed price caps for intra-day and balancing actions. If prices in the real 
time European markets could properly reflect scarcity, and if the GB market could deliver 
the true scarcity prices to EUPHEMIA (including the CP of equation (1)) then good 
market design and pricing would deliver efficient solutions, and other countries with less 
good pricing would lose out, motivating them to improve their market design. Price caps 
hinder this aim, and instead good rules will be needed for out-of-market actions when 
price caps are reached, and/or markets no longer determine flows, and SOs have to 
intervene. These rules or bilateral agreements between the SOs at each end of 
interconnectors are currently lacking or incomplete. If these problems can be addressed, 
then the more demanding task of harmonizing regional capacity markets may be 
unnecessary. 
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Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions 
and Interconnectors1 
 
Abstract 
In the energy trilemma of reliability, sustainability and affordability, politicians treat reliability 
as over-riding. The EU assumes the energy-only Target Electricity Model will deliver reliability 
but the UK argues that a capacity remuneration mechanism is needed. This paper argues that 
capacity auctions tend to over-procure capacity, exacerbating the missing money problem they 
were designed to address. The bias is further exacerbated by failing to address some of the 
missing market problems also neglected in the debate. It examines the case for, criticisms of, and 
outcome of the first GB capacity auction and problems of trading between different capacity 
markets. 
 
1. Introduction 
Britain was the first country to introduce a capacity auction to deliver capacity adequacy 
after EU Third Package2 (to deliver the Target Electricity Model, TEM) was announced 
and it coincided with the date by which the TEM was to come into effect. The TEM is 
designed as an energy-only market that leaves the delivery of capacity adequacy to profit-
motivated investment decisions by liberalized and unbundled generation companies. The 
UK’s Energy Act 2013 that set out the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) rejected relying 
on an energy-only market and legislated for auctions to deliver capacity adequacy.  
This paper examines the design and justification of that capacity auction, its 
relation to the wider issue of reliability, and criticizes the under-studied issue of how the 
amount of capacity to procure was determined. It argues that typical capacity auction 
designs have a bias towards excess procurement, in contrast to fears that the energy-only 
market would lead to under-procurement. While capacity remuneration mechanisms, of 
which auctions are potentially the best, are intended to address the missing money 
problem, by ignoring the missing market problem they perversely exacerbate the missing 
money problem. Capacity auction design also raises important questions for cross-border 
trading and the role of interconnectors, which this paper addresses. 
 
2. Reliability, security of supply and capacity adequacy 
Energy policy aims to deliver security, sustainability and affordability, but of these three 
objectives politicians treat security,3 or more broadly, reliability, as over-riding. In 
electricity markets, reliability is the more inclusive term, measured by long-term 
                                                 
1 Paper arising from the Symposium on Energy Markets and Sustainability, Barcelona, 3 Feb. 
2015 
2 See e.g. http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Europe/Third-energy-package/  
3 Bompard et al (2013) provides a useful taxonomy of terms used to describe security. 
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satisfactory operation “so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of 
such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cybersecurity 
incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements.” (NERC, 2015). It requires both 
security and adequacy. Security is “(T)he ability to withstand sudden disturbances, such 
as electric short circuits or unanticipated losses of system components … ” (ENTSO-E, 
2015). Adequacy  is the ability “to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy 
requirements of the end-use customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and 
reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements.” (NERC, 2015). Security 
is a public good supplied by the System Operator (SO) through his acquisition of a range 
of ancillary and balancing services, while adequacy could, in principle, be delivered by 
competitive energy-only markets, as the TEM envisages (Oren, 2000).  
The TEM was designed as the next step in delivering the EU Integrated 
Electricity Market (IEM) due to come into effect by December 2014. Its core is an 
energy-only market with a single auction platform, EUPHEMIA (Pan-European Hybrid 
Electricity Market Integration Algorithm), for day-ahead, intra-day and balancing trades, 
which simultaneously clears bids and offers and the use of all interconnectors across the 
EU, fragmenting the market into different price zones only after interconnectors are fully 
used. Its working hypothesis, that energy-only markets will deliver capacity adequacy, 
was based on the experience of Nord Pool, which served as the model for the TEM.  
Nord Pool has operated a successful energy-only trading system for many years, 
as have the major power exchanges such as EEX and APX, without any apparent 
problems of capacity adequacy, but not all EU countries have (or once) followed this 
model. Many markets have made or continue to make capacity payments, and DG COMP 
has been very critical of this practice, arguing that they often have more to do with 
compensating generators for stranded assets than delivering reliability at least cost. The 
GB capacity market is,4 as of early 2015, the only capacity market to be explicitly 
designed and operating since the announcement of the Third Energy Package.  
As a number of countries are now considering whether, and if so how, to 
introduce a (or reform their) Capacity Revenue Mechanisms it is timely to examine the 
British experience. Eurelectric is the latest organization to recognize that not all EU 
countries will be happy with the reference energy-only markets of the TEM, and 
“recognizes that properly designed capacity markets, developed in line with the objective 
of the IEM, are an integral part of a future market design.” (Eurelectric, 2015, p4.)  While 
that document discusses what might be required to deliver a reliability standard, it is 
somewhat sceptical on how this might be achieved, instead arguing that “whatever 
reliability standard is chosen, Regulators and TSOs should compute it with 
methodologies and tools that are publicly available.” A second objective of this paper is 
                                                 
4 Northern Ireland is part of the SEM discussed below, leaving Great Britain, GB, as the rest of the UK. 
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to assess how this might best be done, guided by the principle of addressing the missing 
market problem. 
 
3. Missing money and missing markets 
Given the need to instantly balance supply and demand in the electricity system, ensuring 
short-term security of supply is normally an obligation placed on the SO, while longer 
term capacity adequacy is often the subject of regulatory and political concern. EU 
electricity markets are now liberalized, and generation is, for the most part, not subject to 
traditional utility regulation, but to normal competition policy both domestically and 
under the scrutiny of DG COMP. If investment decisions could be solely guided by 
strictly commercial decisions and if markets were not subject to policy interventions or 
price caps, it is plausible that capacity adequacy could be delivered by profit-motivated 
generation investment without explicit policy guidance. For this to be the case, investors 
need confidence that the revenue they earn from the energy markets (including those 
supplying the ancillary services that the SO needs to ensure short-term stability) will be 
adequate to cover investment and operating costs.  
If this revenue is not adequate, there is a “missing money” problem (Joskow, 
2013), but if it is adequate but not perceived to be so by generation companies or their 
financiers, then there is a “missing market” problem (Newbery, 1989). Missing money 
problems arise if price caps are set too low (below the Value of Lost Load, VoLL), or 
ancillary services, such as flexibility, ramp-rates, frequency response, black start 
capability, etc. and/or balancing services are inadequately remunerated, or transmission 
access charges are inefficiently high (important in distorting exit decisions), and/or, 
energy prices are inefficiently low. Inefficiently low wholesale prices seem less likely as 
the normal problem is one of market power raising prices above their competitive level, 
and prices are not necessarily inefficiently low just because there is excess capacity.  
Missing markets create problems if risks cannot be efficiently allocated with 
minimal transaction costs through futures and contract markets, or if important 
externalities such as CO2 and other pollutants are not properly priced. The concept of 
missing markets can be usefully extended to cases in which politicians and/or regulators 
are not willing to offer hedges against future market interventions that could adversely 
affect generator profits. These arguments have been extensively covered in the literature, 
recently in the Symposium on ‘Capacity Markets’, (Joskow, 2013; Cramton, Ockenfels 
and Stoft, 2013). Almost all the discussion about capacity mechanisms concentrates on 
the missing money problem and whether the various market and regulatory/political 
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failures are sufficient to justify a capacity mechanism, and if so, what form it should best 
take.5   
Both the missing money and missing market failures have risen in salience as 
renewable electricity targets have become more ambitious at the same time as the EU 
Emissions Trading System has failed to deliver an adequate, durable and credible carbon 
price, and as such is under constant threat of reform. Absent a futures market with a 
credible counter-party it is hard to be confident that future electricity prices will be 
remunerative for unsubsidized generation, and harder to convince bankers or 
shareholders of the credibility of investment plans based on forecast revenues. If 
renewables continue their planned increase in market share mandated by the EU 
Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC) they will depress average energy prices. This does not 
of itself give rise to an adequacy problem, although utilities may justifiably complain that 
their past investment decisions have been partially expropriated by unanticipated political 
actions. However, it increases the demand for existing services such as primary reserves, 
fast frequency response and inertia and may also increase the need for additional 
ancillary services. If these services are not yet adequately defined and/or their future 
prices are hard to predict there is a missing market problem. If these services are 
underpriced by SOs whose powers of balancing supply and demand may be met by 
administrative or regulatory means (e.g. by requiring those connecting to the grid to make 
some of these services available as part of the grid code), there is a missing money 
problem. In either case these may precipitate a capacity adequacy problem. 
Newbery (2013) documents the analysis that led to the UK’s EMR and its 
embodiment in the Energy Act 2013, which was primarily designed to rescue the UK’s 
failing attempt to meet its renewable energy targets at least cost. Renewable electricity 
suffered from both the missing money and missing market problems, as support was 
provided by Premium Feed-in Tariffs via Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs). 
Their value depended on future electricity prices and the supply-demand balance for the 
ROC s, both potentially volatile. While fossil generation enjoyed a natural hedge in that 
electricity prices mirrored fossil fuel prices (see Newbery, 2013, fig 2), renewables and 
nuclear power, whose fuel costs are zero or very small, are exposed to the full volatility 
of electricity prices (Roques et al., 2006; 2008), which increases risk unnecessarily and 
hence raises the cost of capital, the major part of the total cost.  The EMR instead 
proposed long-term Contracts for Differences (CfDs) with fixed indexed strike prices to 
solve both the missing money and the missing futures market problems. 
 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Adib et al. (2008), Batlle et al. (2007), Battle and Rodilla (2010), Bowring (2008, 
2013), Chao and Wilson (1987, 2002), Crampton and Ockenfels (2011), Cramton and Stoft 
(2008), Joskow (2008), Joskow and Tirole (2007); O’Neill at al. (2006); Platchkov et al (2011); 
and de Vries (2007). 
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3.1 Market failures in delivering reliability 
Before the electricity industry was liberalized and unbundled, the SO had ownership 
control of generation and transmission and was responsible for both system security and 
adequacy. Planned investment ensured that both capabilities would be assessed, which 
was also much easier when essentially all plant had (at least in aggregate) a predictable 
and controllable output. The main security aspects were handling very short-run increases 
in demand (notably during intermissions in major sporting events when consumers all 
simultaneously switch on their electric kettles) or those caused by the loss of a large 
station or transmission link. The standard approach was to specify a reserve margin and 
ensure adequate short-run flexibility by the choice of plant type. Thus the Central 
Electricity Generating Board, CEGB, that pre-dated the British restructuring of 1989, 
computed the required gross reserve margin at 19% based on a Loss of Load Probability 
(LoLP) calculation and a reliability measure (disconnecting some consumers in three 
winters over a 100 years, decided in 1962 (Bates and Fraser, 1974, p122). It built pumped 
storage systems to provide fast response, peaking capacity and to use surplus night-time 
nuclear power (Williams, 1991), as well as jet-derivative gas turbines for fast ramping. 
With liberalization and unbundling all these security services had to be separately 
procured by the SO. Some had to be remunerated, others, such as inertia and the 
additional security offered by interconnectors, came at no cost to the SO. The SO now 
had to manage transmission constraints using price signals (distorted through a failure to 
adopt efficient locational marginal pricing) dealing bilaterally with generators out to 
maximize profits and typically possessing short-run market power. In addition the SO 
had to secure various ancillary and balancing services through spot and contract markets, 
just when the challenges of handling increasing volumes of intermittent and less 
predictable wind were increasing (Newbery, 2010, introducing “Large-scale wind power 
in electricity markets” in that issue of Energy Policy; Newbery, 2012). 
Although the delivery of security services is a public good provided by the SO, 
these services can be procured through some combination of forward, prompt and real-
time markets and contracts. As problems of intermittency increase, so does the challenge 
of ensuring that these services are efficiently priced and procured (Pöyry, 2014).  
The Single Electricity market (SEM) of the island of Ireland is probably at the 
forefront of addressing these problems, as it is a small moderately isolated system in 
which individual power stations are large and lumpy relative to peak demand (up to 10%) 
and the system is being adapted to handle up to 70% non-synchronous wind penetration.6 
One (implausible) solution would have price signals varying over very short periods of 
                                                 
6 Conventional rotating generation turbines are synchronised to the grid frequency and have 
substantial inertia, so that if there is a momentary loss of supply, that inertia prevents the 
frequency falling too fast. Wind power has effectively no inertia, which has to be provided in 
some form to maintain frequency within acceptable limits. 
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time. A sudden fall in frequency caused by a sudden increase in demand relative to 
supply means that the value of power in the next cycle (1/50th of a second) has increased, 
and the speed of response is key to minimizing the disruption. Figure 1 lists the various 
products and their time domain that the SEM Committee defined in their consultation 
document (SEM, 2014), grouped into the three categories of Synchronous Inertial 
Response (SIR, usually delivered by the inertia of synchronized generators), operating 
reserves (primary, POR; secondary, SOR; and tertiary, TOR), and Ramping or 
Replacement Reserves (RR), with some overlap between them.  
If prices were to move in response to instantaneous system conditions, then it 
would be potentially profitable to have the capability to respond on the appropriate time 
scale. In practice, market designs vary in their granularity, with the most flexible having 
5 minute settlement periods (Australia). Typically Continental balancing markets have a 
15 minute settlement period,7 while GB and the SEM have a half-hourly settlement 
period in the Day Ahead Market (DAM), and most Continental power exchanges and the 
EUPHEMIA auction platform have hourly resolution in the DAM. Increasing granularity 
improves the accuracy of the temporal pattern of price signals to guide the choice of 
flexibility, but runs up against the practical constraint that the system state requires a 
finite amount of time to re-estimate, probably of the order of minutes, while the 
transaction costs of dealing at high frequency make very short-term markets illiquid. 
 
Figure 1 Various flexible systems services defined for the SEM 
Source: SEM (2014)  
 
Given the inability and absence of energy markets at this level of time granularity, 
new products are needed to supplement existing products. The SEM Committee 
consulted on how to procure them in early 2015, given that the supply side for some 
                                                 
7 Also suggested by Mott MacDonald (2013). California is interested in 5 minute granularity. 
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services is highly concentrated, raising market power issues. In this case many markets 
are missing as their procurement is still undecided, making it hard to estimate their future 
revenues. When choosing what type of generating plant to build, investors have a choice 
of characteristics with inevitable trade-offs: flexible plant with high ramp rates is either 
more expensive or less efficient than less flexible plant with lower ramp rates, but unless 
investors can forecast the revenue from selling these security services, it is hard to make 
efficient plant choices.  
The classic public good problem facing the regulators and the SO is how to value 
these various services, given that they are provided in bundles of varying proportions by 
different technologies. Some of the services reduce LoLP, and should be informed by the 
VoLL, but others reduce the need to curtail renewable generation, which is a political 
objective of uncertain value. 
 
3.2 Defining and measuring reliability 
Eurelectric (2015) provides a useful summary of the various ways used to measure 
reliability. Most EU electricity systems specify the “Loss of Load Expectation” (LoLE), 
which for most and for GB is three hours per year. This is a forward looking measure, 
that taking a representative and large number of possible outcomes (of weather, plant 
reliability, demand, etc.) for some future period, the electricity system should perform 
better than averaging “Losses of Load events” of three hours per year. Clearly there is a 
difference between losing load for the entire population and controlled disconnections for 
a modest number of consumers, and Eurelectric (2015) argues that a better measure is the 
Loss of Expected Energy (LoEE) measured in MWh/year. National Grid (2014a) uses the 
cost of LoEE to determine the procurement amount for the capacity auction.  
The former CEGB had a standard of disconnections in three winters in 100 years 
or 3%, while Belgium had a 1% standard and Spain a 5% standard (Webb, 1977). This 
was often translated into a gross reserve margin (Transmission Entry Capacity less peak 
load) required to deliver the reliability standard. Thus the CEGB set it at 19% , made up 
of a de-rating factor of 11% and remaining outage risks of 6%, so that the de-rated 
reliability margin was 7% (6%/0.89). Such quantitative measures sit well within the 
planning framework of a centrally controlled electricity system pre-liberalization. 
The other more market-oriented approach to reliability is to specify the Value of 
Lost Load, VoLL, the amount that consumers should be willing to pay to avoid 
disconnection. In a future with sufficiently smart meters, consumers would be able to 
sign a contract with the electricity supplier stating the maximum amount they would be 
willing to pay for each tranche of firm power, with the smart meter disconnecting 
appliances at each specified price point, leaving presumably some lights and electronic 
equipment until last. As such that would represent the complete private good market 
solution to the problem and would avoid the missing money if not the missing (future) 
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market problem, provided the short-run prices were efficiently set at their efficient 
scarcity value. This is the sum of the System Marginal Cost (SMC) plus a Capacity 
Payment, CP, where 
CP = LoLP*(VoLL-SMC),     (1) 
The relationship between the security standard and the VoLL is symmetric, in that 
if capacity investment decisions are based on revenues determined by (1) and the VoLL 
is pre-determined, then the resulting capacity will give rise to a LoLE. If the standard is 
as a predetermined LoLE, the cost of new capacity implies a cost of delivering the LoLP 
and hence the VoLL.  
Britain has followed both models. The English Pool set the VoLL at £(2012)5,000 
(€6,250/MWh at £1 = €1.25), letting the market determine capacity. After the Pool was 
replaced with an energy-only market in 2001, the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) specified the LoLE.  National Grid (2014a) deduced the 2018 VoLL as 
£(2012)17,000/MWh (€(2012)21,250/MWh), higher than direct estimates of the 
willingness to pay to avoid disconnections (London Economics, 2013). 
 
3.3 Can energy-only markets deliver adequate reliability? 
One completely legitimate case for a capacity payment is that if generators are required to 
bid their Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC, mostly fuel costs), as under the Bidding Code 
of Practice of the SEM (SEM, 2007), they will fail to recover their fixed costs without 
such an addition. The Electricity Pool of England and Wales also added the CP of (1), but 
allowed generators to offer an unrestricted supply function (which, given their market 
power, was often above SRMC, Green and Newbery, 1992; Newbery, 1995; Sweeting, 
2007). In this period of benign liberalization, high prices led to considerable entry and an 
excessive reserve margin. 
In the energy-only market envisaged by the TEM, generators will offer supply 
functions that should reflect the scarcity value of electricity (and their degree of market 
power). Figure 2 shows the day-ahead price duration curves for several European power 
exchanges in 2012. What is striking is that most exchange prices do not exceed 
€200/MWh, and even the most peaky, France, only does so 0.25 of 1% of the time (about 
22 hours per year). Given that the VoLL in the English Pool until 2001 was 
€(2012)6,250/MWh and the current implied VoLL in GB is €(2012)21,250/MWh (both at 
£1 = €1.25), these prices indicate a low LoLP or high reliability. Given existing capacity 
levels that is a reasonable inference, but the problem again is one of missing (futures) 
markets. Investment lags in delivering capacity adequacy are 2-4 years for peaking plant 
(longer for most base-load plant), beyond the time horizon of adequately liquid futures 
markets (and they only offer one year’s hedge). 
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Figure 2 Price Duration curves of day-ahead hourly prices, 2012 
Sources: MIP (Market Index Price) and NL prices from APX, Germany and France from EEX 
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the 2008 balancing buy prices8 in the 
energy-only market that replaced the Pool were considerably peakier than the old Pool 
prices (which included an explicit CP and also probably reflected more market power). 
Thus energy-only markets can reflect scarcity, and properly calculated capacity payments 
may be very low if the reserve margin is adequate as LoLP is roughly exponential in 
demand less derated capacity (Newbery, 2005). However, by 2013-14, the GB Balancing 
Mechanism had a price duration curve quite similar to those shown in Figure 2, with 
prices above €200/MWh for less than 0.25 of 1% of the time, and well below the French 
day-ahead price duration curve. 
Thus one might conclude that energy-only markets (which include balancing 
markets) can deliver sufficiently sharp scarcity prices that should signal the profitability 
of adequate new investment, provided all the other security services are adequately 
remunerated (i.e. resolving any of those missing market problems). This might be 
plausible if all investment decisions were taken on commercial grounds as in the 1990s, 
that prices were not capped, that the policy environment were predictable and stable, and 
that either liquid forward market existed for a reasonably fraction of the proposed plant 
life (i.e. 20+ years ahead of the final investment decision) or credible long-term power 
purchase agreements could be signed with credit-worthy counterparties. Unfortunately, 
hardly any of these conditions hold in the TEM.  
                                                 
8 For a description of the British Balancing Mechanism see Newbery (2005).  
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Figure 3 Scarcity pricing in GB under the Pool and in the Balancing Mechanism 
Sources:   National Grid, Elexon 
Notes: PPP is Pool Purchase Price, SMP is the System Marginal Price, so PPP-SMP=CP 
3.4 Market, institutional and political/regulatory failures 
While price caps are set at rather low levels in the US, exacerbating the “missing money” 
problem, there are also, if much higher, price caps in EUPHEMIA (for day-ahead at 
€3,000/MWh, a price that France has hit on numerous occasions). The lack of forward 
markets and long-term contracts might not be so critical if the future were reasonably 
predictable and stable, but this is far from the case at present. EU Climate Change policy 
is failing, in conflict with Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC), and surely ripe for as yet 
uncertain reform. Large volumes of unreliable renewables increase the need for flexible 
reserves, which in the past came from obsolescing plant, mostly oil or coal. This plant is 
now being decommissioned because of the Large Combustion Plant Directive and the 
Integrated Emissions Directive.  
Increasing renewables (mainly wind and solar PV) add little to reliable capacity, 
as it is unavailable on still cold dark winter nights, but reduces average wholesale prices. 
If the average capacity factor of on-shore wind is 25%, then the GB target of 30% of 
electricity from wind requires capacity of 30/25 times or 120% of average demand. In 
windy conditions that would often displace all conventional plant and could lead, under 
present subsidy structures, to negative prices. 
Intermittent generation increases the need for additional flexible plant that can be 
called up at short notice if the wind falls or the sun fades. In addition, new plant will be 
needed to replace retiring plant (not just coal, but in the UK, France and Germany, 
substantial volumes of nuclear plant as well). That plant will need considerably higher 
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prices when renewable output is low than has been recently experienced. Even if the 
carbon price is currently low, the EU is committed to an 80% reduction in Greenhouse 
Gas emissions by 2050. Coal is twice the carbon intensity of gas, so utilities are unlikely 
to build durable (40-60 year) coal-fired plant that would face tight future emissions 
limits, leaving gas-fired plant as the only alternative. Unfortunately, crashed electricity 
prices and high gas prices precipitated by the closure of Japan’s nuclear fleet has made 
their economics very unattractive. 
The UK introduced a carbon price floor in the 2011 Budget (HMT, 2011) that 
would support the price of CO2 at £16/tonne in 2013, rising to £30/tonne (€35/tonne) in 
2020, and projected to rise to £70/tonne by 2030 (all at 2009 prices).  This threatened the 
operation of existing coal-fired plant. As an example of policy instability, the 2014 
Budget froze the carbon price floor – clearly an instrument subject to the whim of 
chancellors creates additional investment uncertainty. It would be a brave politician who 
trusted these markets to deliver reliability.  
 
4. The GB capacity auction 
In response to the looming capacity crunch and other market failures set out in Ofgem 
(2009) and subsequent DECC consultations (Newbery, 2012a), the UK passed the Energy 
Act 2013 setting out the EMR, which includes a Capacity Mechanism to ensure adequate 
capacity. GB now has the Secretary of State for Energy & Climate Change, advised by 
DECC, deciding how much capacity is required. The capacity auction is a single-price 
descending clock auction with a demand schedule as shown in figure 4. National Grid as 
SO was charged to recommend the target volume of capacity to secure four years after 
the auction (which was termed the T-4 auction).   
National Grid (2014a) chose the amount to procure balancing the cost of 
additional capacity against the cost of the Loss of Expected Energy, as shown in Figure 5. 
National Grid (2014a) projected that the auction clearing price would likely be set at the 
Cost of New Entry (CONE), estimated at £49/kWyr. This was the missing money a 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) might need given its revenues from all other 
markets and after paying the Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges. 
These range from £30/kWyr (in NW Scotland), to negative (-£5/kWyr in Cornwall) 
(National Grid, 2013). Entrants are given 15-year indexed contracts, while existing plant 
receive one-year contracts to defer exit decisions until the next auction.  
The missing money can be estimated from the VoLL (£17/kWh) less the 
maximum the SO pays for balancing actions (£6/kWh) to give £11/kWh, times 3 hrs 
LoLE, or £33/kWyr. The effective cap in the Balancing Mechanism is £9,999/MWh 
would reduce the missing money to £21/kWyr.  
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Figure 4 Auction demand curve as proposed 
Source: DECC (2013)  
 
 
Figure 5 Capacity needed to minimize total cost in the Slow Progression scenario 
Source: National Grid (2014a, fig 12, p50) with additions by the author 
 
The auction design was best-practice (Newbery and Grubb, 2015) but flawed in 
requiring the SO to advise the minister on the procurement amount. The SO stands 
accountable if “the lights go out” but does not pay for the capacity. The minister wishes 
to avoid newspaper headlines predicting blackouts resulting from his decision. Both 
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argue for excess procurement. DECC appointed an independent Panel of Technical 
Experts (PTE) to comment on the analysis, and they made a number of strong (but, for 
the 2014 auction, ineffective) criticisms. 
 
4.1 Criticisms of the capacity to procure 
The PTE first criticized the terminology of “Loss of Load” as emotive and misleading. 
The GB regulator, Ofgem, defines a “Loss of Load event” as one in which market 
demand exceeds market supply and as such the SO has to intervene to balance the 
system. For that purpose the SO can call on a range of increasingly expensive options: 
asking generators to temporarily exceed rated capacity; invoking ‘new balancing 
services’;9 cutting interconnector exports to zero, requesting imports; reducing voltage 
(“brown outs”),10 before finally resorting to selective disconnections. The crucial point is 
that these actions cost less, often much less, than VoLL and hence bias the unserved load 
cost and the target capacity in figure 5 upward.  
Successful Capacity Market Units in the auction receive a Capacity Agreement 
which requires them to be available in “stress events” signaled four hours ahead. DECC 
(2014, §391) defines these events as “any settlement periods in which either voltage 
control or controlled load shedding are experienced at any point on the system for 15 
minutes or longer. …  Periods of voltage control or load shedding resulting from failures 
or deficiencies in the transmission or distribution systems are not considered as stress 
events.” However, these “notices of inadequate system margin” are issued “based on the 
available capacity (declared ‘maximum export limit’ (MEL) minus transmission system 
demand and reserve for response capacity.”  DECC (2014, box, p107.) 
National Grid (2014a) chose the amount to procure using a Least Worst Regrets 
approach as it was unwilling to attach explicit probabilities to the various scenarios 
considered. The result of overvaluing the cost of “Loss of Load” is to increase the 
capacity at which the Least Worst Regret cost schedule is minimized (figure 5). “Slow 
progression” reaches a cost minimum at 53.3 GW for 2018-19 delivery. The net 
procurement target is 53.3-w-x-y-z-0.4 GW, where w, x, y and z refer to various 
distributed energy resources and opt-out plant. The 0.4 GW is existing short-term 
operating reserve.  
The PTE (DECC, 2014a) strongly criticized National Grid for assuming no net 
imports in stress periods, despite 3.75 GW interconnection capacity and potential new 
capacity of 2.25 GW that might be available by 2018-19. This seemed perverse, as all 
                                                 
9   “The new balancing services are Demand Side Balancing Reserve (DSBR) and Supplemental 
Balancing Reserve (SBR).” National Grid announced its tender for these new services on 10 June 
2014 (http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/additionalmeasures ). 
10 The CEGB estimated that voltage reductions reduce load by 7½% in the 1970s (Bates and 
Fraser, 1974) but National Grid now estimates only 1½% in the absence of firm evidence. 
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parties (Ofgem, DECC and National Grid) agreed interconnectors increased security. 
Three reports commissioned by these parties (Pöyry, 2012, 2013; Redpoint, 2013) argued 
that interconnector capacity could displace domestic capacity by 50-80% of its value. 
Even DECC’s Final Impact Assessment, published just before the procurement decision 
(DECC, 2014b), estimated the amount of interconnector capacity to include in the total 
procurement amount at 2.9 GW. Ignoring interconnectors could move the auction 
clearing price from the cost of new entry of £49/kWyr to that set by existing plant 
(maximum of £25/kWyr), increasing the auction cost by £1.3 billion per year. 
Ignoring interconnectors seemed particularly perverse as the TEM aims to 
integrate markets across borders. Market coupling already dispatches GB Continental 
interconnectors in the EUPHEMIA day-ahead market (DAM). Interconnector flows 
already reflect willingness to pay in the DAM, and will soon do so in the intra-day and 
real time markets when network codes are agreed. 
 
4.2 Possible consequences of excessive capacity procurement 
Excess procured capacity will lower future wholesale prices with a number of effects, not 
all immediately obvious. First, lower prices reduce the revenue new entrants can expect 
from the energy markets, increase the CONE and raise the auction price. Second, it 
undermines the old market design in which investment in conventional generation was at 
the discretion of private companies making commercial decisions. No company would 
invest in conventional generation without a capacity agreement given its large 
disadvantage compared to those with agreements. The amount of new plant will therefore 
be entirely determined by the minister, ending a key element of the liberalized market. 
All non-fossil generation will also be granted long-term Contracts for Difference  (CfDs) 
under the EMR, moving GB to the Single Buyer model ruled out in earlier EU Electricity 
Directives. 
Third, lower prices increase payments to low-carbon CfDs, which receive the 
difference between the contracted strike and wholesale price. As the Government limits 
total renewables payments through the Levy Control Framework, the perverse effect is to 
support less renewable electricity, although the EMR was designed to remove obstacles 
to meeting the renewables target. 
Fourth, the commercial case for interconnectors depends on price differences, 
with GB typically importing from cheaper Continental markets. Lower GB prices reduce 
arbitrage profits, undermining the investment case for the additional interconnectors 
when they are increasingly needed to balance growing intermittent generation across 
wider market areas. Ignoring interconnectors risks a self-fulfilling but expensive policy of 
autarky. 
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Fifth, although the future wholesale price will be lower, offsetting possibly a large 
part of the consumer cost, it will be hard to convince consumers of this. They will see the 
gross cost estimated at 53.3 GW x £49m/GWyr = £2.6 billion per year.  
Finally, on 2nd December 2014, after the PTE had published its critical report and 
the Secretary of State had decided on the procurement volume, but before the auction on 
18th December, the Treasury’s National Infrastructure Plan announced that 
interconnectors would be eligible for the 2015 capacity market.11 It would have been easy 
to have left room for interconnectors (e.g. adding another element to the -w-x-y-z-0.4 GW 
deduction from the target volume) and lower the net amount to procure. 
 
4.3 The outcome of the 2014 capacity auction 
The auction cleared at £(2012) 19.40/kWyr (National Grid, 2014b). The auction produced 
several surprises. First, the auction cleared at less than 40% of the predicted CONE value 
of £49/kWyr (although close to the missing money estimated above assuming a balancing 
cap of £9,999/MWh). The estimated CONE was based on new entry of CCGT, and two 
CCGTs entered, supplying about 60% of the total 2,795 MW new entry. Second, the next 
largest (28%) entry category was OCGT/ reciprocating engines, average size 11 MW. 
The third largest contribution (6%) was from unproven Demand Side Response (DSR, all 
with a one-year contract, other new entrants have 15-year contracts).  
One might expect that DSR and OCGTs would require a lower strike price, 
particularly as they can contribute to significantly reducing TNUoS charges if they are 
embedded with major loads, but the low price that CCGTs were willing to accept is 
surprising, and may be based on optimistic views of gas prices (which were expected to 
decline by the time of the auction) or high balancing prices. National Grid announced its 
tender for new balancing services on 10 June 2014,12 reducing the extent of the missing 
money for these services after DECC had published its estimate of the net CONE.   
The final point is that the auction demonstrates the value of market-based 
methods of revealing entry costs, and the danger of leaving such decisions to SOs or 
regulators (as in the SEM,13 where the regulators calculate the cost of Best New Entry 
and set it at a high price).  
5. Biases in capacity auctions and energy-only markets 
The arguments above strongly suggest that if procurement decisions are left to politicians 
advised by the SO, they will err on the high side, and tend to ignore supplies from outside 
their control area (over interconnectors). Their caution is exacerbated by the emotive and 
                                                 
11 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-infrastructure-plan  
12 At http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/additionalmeasures  
13 See http://www.allislandproject.org/en/cp_current-consultations.aspx?article=75c548a7-34ee-
497c-afd2-62f8aa0062df  
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misleading terminology of “Loss of Load”. Some of these shortcomings can be addressed 
by requiring the SO to cost and quantify the actions that are taken in stress events that fall 
short of controlled disconnections. Delegating the decision to independent agencies, 
perhaps to an Independent Planning and System Operator could depoliticize the decision 
(but might not remove the fear of disconnections through inadequacy, nor the bias of not 
paying for capacity).  
There is a more fundamental problem in that if future energy prices are 
competitively delivered and if all security services (ancillary and balancing) are properly 
priced, the missing market and missing money problems can both be addressed by 
offering suitable hedging contracts, of which the auctioned capacity agreement is an 
excellent example. Price caps could be replaced by reliability options or one-way CfDs 
that have a high strike price, and which allow consumers or their suppliers to hedge 
against high prices while allowing the spot and balancing market prices to reach scarcity 
levels needed for efficient actions (in demand reduction and interconnector trade) (see 
e.g. Vásquez et al, 2002; Bidwell, 2005). 
Now consider the costs of under or over-specifying the amount to procure. Over-
procurement, as noted above, risks depressing future prices and hence reducing future 
energy and ancillary service revenues, requiring a higher auction price in compensation. 
While addressing the missing markets problem it risks amplifying the missing money 
problem. In contrast, under-procurement leads to expectations of higher future prices, 
requiring a lower capacity auction bid as the capacity agreement does not preclude 
earning revenues in all the energy markets. If the price is very low, investors may 
conclude that investing without a capacity agreement has relatively low risk, particularly 
as the design of the GB auction offers a T-4 contract of 15 years for new plant, but 
successive T-1 contracts of one-year for existing plant at the same clearing price, for 
which speculative plant would be eligible. A signal to err on the side of under-
procurement would be underwritten by the ability to true up closer to delivery, reducing 
risks, as any over-procurement would merely delay the moment at which more capacity 
was needed in the auction, and should limit the period of inadequate revenue to a year or 
so. 
 
6. The need for regional coordination 
Eureletric (2015) argues strongly for a design of regional capacity markets which places 
the obligation on generation (or demand) regardless of national location. This requires a 
common regional capacity adequacy assessment and no double payment (i.e. if capacity 
has an agreement from country A it would be denied one from B and would be excluded 
from B’s capacity assessment, subject to adequate interconnector capacity from B to A).  
While this may be a desirable long-run objective, it is hardly compatible with the 
existing Third Package. Meanwhile countries will have to decide how to treat 
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interconnectors connecting possibly very different (or no) capacity markets. Provided the 
auction platform can accommodate efficient scarcity prices (i.e. provided at least the 
intra-day and balancing markets are not capped at too low a level), then trading over any 
interconnector will only benefit a country that ensures that the relevant prices are 
efficient, as in (1). Suppose A and B trade but A has a higher VoLL than B, and hence a 
larger reliability margin. If A and B both have stress events, A can outbid B to secure 
imports, with B accepting a higher LoLP reflecting its lower willingness to pay to avoid 
disconnections, while ensuring that domestic consumers were insulated from these high 
trading prices through the contract coverage provided by the Reliability Options.  
The logic of making adequacy as close as possible to a private market good 
(through allowing efficient pricing) is that there can be gains from trade for the efficiently 
priced market even when market designs are different. If prices are inefficient in B, then 
it is they who lose, not A. That provides incentives to reform and avoids the need for 
politically fraught agreements on harmonization. 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
Missing money and missing markets provide compelling reasons for a capacity payment 
in competitive electricity markets dominated by politically determined and subsidized 
unreliable generation and where investors lack confidence in future revenues. Capacity 
auctions (GB provides a good example) address the missing money problem and part of 
the missing market problem (the missing futures markets), which still needs efficient 
solutions - markets, auctions and procurement contracts - for location, flexibility, etc. 
needed to deliver security. More complex category auctions may also be the best way of 
procuring these services. The part of the adequacy debate that has been neglected is how 
to, and who should, determine the amount and type of capacity to procure (generation, 
DSR, interconnection), a problem that is exacerbated by misunderstandings over what a 
“Loss of Load” event means and what it might cost.  
This paper argues that this neglect biases towards over-procurement, which leads 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy that merchant generation investment can no longer be relied 
upon. Perversely, this exacerbates the missing money problem that capacity auctions 
were designed to address. The bias is further exacerbated by failing to address some of 
the missing market problems that have also been neglected in the debate. 
Whether or not interconnectors should be included in auctions is less important 
than that their contribution should be recognized in determining the procurement amount. 
All British interconnectors are HVDC controllable links whose flows can be rapidly 
reversed and as such could provide extra imports at short notice, but they can also impose 
sudden large loads on the GB system if they switch to exporting. The UK Government, 
possibly under pressure from DG COMP over State Aid concerns after the PTE had 
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published their criticisms (DECC, 2014a), decided to include interconnectors in the next 
auction for 2019-20 delivery, and consult on how to determine their reliable capacity. 
There remain a number of policy issues to resolve, not least how the European 
auction platform EUPHEMIA will determine the direction of flows close to real time, 
when stress events that the capacity auction was designed to address are likely to emerge. 
EUPHEMIA has a €3,000/MWh price cap on the DAM, well below the VoLL. It has not 
yet (early 2015) fixed price caps for intra-day and balancing actions. If prices in the real 
time European markets could properly reflect scarcity, and if the GB market could deliver 
the true scarcity prices to EUPHEMIA (including the CP of equation (1)) then good 
market design and pricing would deliver efficient solutions, and other countries with less 
good pricing would lose out, motivating them to improve their market design. Price caps 
hinder this aim, and instead good rules will be needed for out-of-market actions when 
price caps are reached, and/or markets no longer determine flows, and SOs have to 
intervene. These rules or bilateral agreements between the SOs at each end of 
interconnectors are currently lacking or incomplete. If these problems can be addressed, 
then the more demanding task of harmonizing regional capacity markets may be 
unnecessary. 
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